The influence of knowledge in the replication of routines by Becker, Markus & Lazaric, Nathalie
The influence of knowledge in the replication of routines
Markus Becker, Nathalie Lazaric
To cite this version:
Markus Becker, Nathalie Lazaric. The influence of knowledge in the replication of routines.
E´conomie applique´e : archives de l’Institut de science e´conomique applique´e, Institut des sci-
ences mathe´matiques et e´conomiques applique´es - ISMEA, 2003, LVI (3), pp.65-94. <hal-
00457124>
HAL Id: hal-00457124
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00457124
Submitted on 18 Feb 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1
 
 
 
The influence of knowledge in the replication of routines 
 
 
 
Markus C. Becker 
Department of Marketing 
University of Southern Denmark 
DK-5230 Odense M 
Denmark 
Tel. +45-65503350 
Fax +45-66155129 
mab@sam.sdu.dk 
 
 
      and 
 
 
Nathalie Lazaric 
Latapses, CNRS IDEFI   
250 rue Albert Einstein 
06 600 Valbonne  
Sophia Antipolis, France  
Tel + 33- 4 93 95 43 88 
Fax + 33-93 65 37 98  
Lazaric@idefi.cnrs.fr 
 
 
 
 2
The influence of knowledge in the replication of routines  
 
Markus C. Becker and Nathalie Lazaric  
 
 
Abstract 
 
From a resource-based perspective, one of the most important levers of firm strategy are 
resources that are difficult to imitate. A crucial challenge for managers then is to replicate 
these resources within the firm, while at the same time protecting them from imitation by 
competitors. Organizational routines are often named as candidates for such resources. A 
good understanding of the replication of organizational routines is therefore of great strategic 
interest. This article focuses on one aspect that seems to play an important role in the 
replication of routines: knowledge. The objective of the article is to identify knowledge-
related aspects that have an influence in the replication of routines. In this and by defining 
routines in their social and cognitive dimensions, it contributes to a better understanding of 
their duplication process. 
 
Key words: Organizational routines, replication, knowledge, tacit knowledge, codification, 
resource-based view 
 
 Résumé :  
 
Dans les travaux d’inspiration Penrosienne, le problème  fondamental  réside dans la capacité 
à générer des ressources spécifiques. Un des défis  pour la stratégie réside, en effet,  à créer et 
à répliquer de telles ressources au sein de la firme, tout en la protégeant de ses concurrents. 
Les routines jouent souvent ce rôle. On  peut donc comprendre pourquoi leur copie est 
cruciale. Cet article tente de souligner une variable essentielle dans le problème de la 
réplication des routines : la connaissance. L’objectif est d’observer différentes dimensions de 
la connaissance et son impact sur le transfert des routines. En partant d’une définition des 
routines sous leur double  dimension -cognitive et politique-, et en soulignant les limites des 
processus de codification, nous tenterons d’offrir un cadre analytique suffisamment riche pour 
observer les problèmes de duplication.  
 
 
Mots clés : routines organisationnelles, réplication, connaissance, connaissances tacites, 
codification, ressources.  
Supprimé : ¶
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Introduction  
 
From a resource-based perspective, one of the most important levers of firm strategy are 
resources that are difficult to imitate (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). A crucial challenge for 
managers then is to replicate these resources within the firm, while at the same time 
protecting them from imitation by competitors (Winter and Szulanski 2001; Szulanski and 
Winter 2002).  
 
Organizational routines1 are often named as candidates for such resources (Grant 1996). In the 
business literature, the notion of an 'organizational routine'2 denotes repetitive, stable activity. 
Many social activities in the realm of the economy, such as production and exchange, are 
carried out in much the same way every time. What makes these activities stable and 
persistent is the fact that when routines are repeated, there is not much variation from one 
repetition to the next. What are the sources of variation between one manifestation of a 
routine and the next repetition? The answer to this question holds the key to understanding 
organizational and economic change and stability. By analyzing how organizational routines 
change, we can open the ’black box’ of the firm and trace the processes taking place within 
the organization structure as they unfold over time3. Our perspective will be that of routines 
being replicated from one time period to the next. In such a perspective, to understand how 
the replication process works, and how variation arises in the replication process (making the 
copy different from the template) is crucial for understanding organizational change. It also 
helps understand such concrete issues as the transfer of successful business practices, for 
instance of manufacturing processes from the ‘mother plant’ to a newly founded plant. 
 
Understanding how the replication and imitation4 of routines work therefore is an important 
strategic question, due to the role of sources of inimitability for the resource-based view of the 
                                                
1 On organizational routines see Nelson and Winter 1982; Winter 1990; Hodgson 1992; Langlois 1992; Nelson 
1994; Cohen and Bacdayan 1994; Cohen et al 1996; Pentland and Rueter 1994; Pentland et al 1996; Egidi and 
Narduzzo 1997; Coombs and Metcalfe 1998; Amit and Belcourt 1999; Knott and McKelvey 1999; Costello 
2000; Karim and Mitchell 2000; Betsch et al. 2001. On the history of the concept see Becker (2003 
forthcoming). 
2 Routines are social, not individual, phenomena. They involve multiple actors. Repetitive activity of an 
individual actor is a habit (Hodgson 1993b). There has been confusion about the individual or social character of 
routines. Since the recent article by Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000), however, such confusion should not persist 
any more. Throughout this article, we mean organizational routines when we speak of 'routines'. 
3 As has been noted, the relationship of structure and activity is a recursive one (Giddens 1984, Archer 1995). 
See also Feldman (2000) and the passages later in the paper. 
4 In line with the use of these terms by other authors (Winter and Szulanski, 2001), ’replication’ is used where 
the replication effort is made inside the firm, and ’imitation’, if the imitator is another firm. 
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firm (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). In their recent overview of ‘Research Directions for 
Knowledge Management’, Nonaka and Teece (2001) have also identified imitation and 
replication as one of the key research topics.  
 
A body of recent research has focused on the replication of routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Winter 1990; Winter and Szulanski 2001; Szulanski and Winter 2002; see also Rivkin 2001). 
One of the principal findings is the strategic importance of what Winter and Szulanski (2001) 
call “an ‘Arrow core’ – an abstract, quasi-informational source of economic merit that can be 
replicated by embodiment in new resources at new locations”. They argue that the ‘Arrow 
core’ has the characteristic, like information, to be non-rivalrous in use while the template 
routine itself is rivalrous in use. Access to the template routine therefore is what distinguishes 
replicability (by the firm itself) from imitability (by other firms) – a question of great 
importance from a strategic point of view, namely of protecting the sources of sustained 
competitive advantage. Focusing on the knowledge-related aspects of replication therefore 
helps recognize public-good characteristics of routines replication. A main challenge for 
managers is to enhance the public-goods character of the productive knowledge contained in 
organizational routines inside the firm, while blocking it from extending to the whole industry 
(Winter and Szulanski 2001). 
 
This finding shows how taking knowledge-related aspects of routines into explicit 
consideration improves our understanding of the replication of routines. Yet, although both 
the replication of routines and the role of knowledge in business have received attention, the 
role of knowledge in the replication of routines – and its impact on the replication outcome – 
is not yet fully understood. The paper therefore builds on Winter and Szulanski’s (2000; 
2001) argument. While Winter and Szulanski (2001) have focused on aspects such as the 
public-good character of information, the remainder of this article has the objective to identify 
other knowledge-related aspects that make a difference for the outcome of the replication of 
routines. This article therefore focuses on the role of knowledge in the replication of 
organizational routines.  
 
The article draws from two different literatures in order to cast light on the role of knowledge 
in the replication of organizational routines. On the one hand, it reports a framework for 
conceptualizing replication processes, building on such frameworks in the philosophy of 
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science5. As other authors have shown (Knudsen 2001; Knudsen 2002a; Knudsen 2000b), 
these frameworks provide a consistent conceptualization of the replication process. On the 
other hand, the article draws on the conceptual and empirical literature in the field of 
management and strategy, which has been concerned with the overlap between studying 
knowledge and studying processes of replication or (more widely understood) transfer of such 
knowledge.  
 
In the first part, we define routines with their social and cognitive dimensions in order to 
consider the problem of replication with these two constituents parts. In the second part, we 
focus on the conceptualisation of the replication process. In the third part, we will explore 
extensively the role of knowledge for the replication of routines, insisting on differences and 
links between replication and codification. In the fourth part, we describe the forms and 
dimensions of replication, insisting on technical and human aspects. Finally, a general 
discussion and conclusions follow.  
 
 
(1) The implication of the definition of routines on the replication process  
 
We will start by defining routines in both their political and cognitive dimension, in order to 
identify the implication of this conceptualization on the replication debate.  
 
(1.1) Routines as reservoirs of knowledge 
 
The first step in gaining a better understanding of the replication process is a clear definition 
of routines. If there are ambiguities in our understanding of what a routine is, our 
understanding of the replication of routines will be muddled. Routines are present at two 
levels (in their potentiality and in their expression) because at the same time, they are 
reservoirs of knowledge encapsulated in organizations, and a concrete representation of this 
knowledge: the repertoire of knowledge activated and performed daily (Lazaric 1999, Lazaric 
and Mangolte 1999, Lazaric 2000). Understanding replication also requires an understanding 
of the visible or invisible part of the knowledge as different ontological levels are present in 
the routine concept (rules in their abstract form and some recurrent part of action). The 
problem of change in micro constituents is therefore immediately connected to change at the 
                                                
5 The frameworks are thus not dependent on any simple analogy to biology. 
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macro levels (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002). For example, in an institutional perspective, routines 
and habits have to be maintained in order to establish patterns of life associated with ways of 
thinking.  
 
As Nelson (1995) has reminded us, routines sometimes remain stable because of implicit 
contracts embedded at their establishment, producing a kind of truce among organizational 
members. It is true that change in the expression of routines may imply a move in social 
position, leading people to take a new look at their role inside the hierarchical structure. This 
change is sometimes avoided by a transformation of hierarchical order or by the explicit 
refusal to follow the new rules of the game. For example, in our study of the implementation 
of a new ISO 9002 norm, the rules of the game were interpreted in different ways by the 
various actors. Furthermore, the new routines to be implemented were working not all 
smoothly partly due to the new effort convention to be found inside the firm, but also due to 
willingness of some actors to refuse the settlement of new social coalition, notably for 
maintenance technicians who saw their discretionary power tend to diminish and tried to slow 
down the process in this way (Lazaric and Denis, 2001 b). 
 
(1.2) Routines as reservoirs of creativity  
 
Actors are not automats even if they need to acquire automatisms to gain efficiency. This 
implies that even if they do a job in a certain way, human creativity exists and hierarchical 
power has some limits to impose routines at higher or lower levels if they are not explained 
and justified (Leibenstein 1986). This leads actors to follow the rules but to interpret them in 
such a way as to exercise their discretionary power for doing their job. That is to say, up to 
which point people are really intended to change the routines and until which point they 
deviate from the template is a question that remains quite open because of the difficulty to 
observe this process. As Nelson and Winter have written, “a routine may involve extensive 
direct interactions with the organization’s environment and the making of numerous choices 
that are contingent both upon the state of the environment and the state of the organization 
itself, but these choices involve no process of deliberation by the top management. The 
intervention of top managers in the detailed functioning of lower levels is ordinarily 
symptomatic of an attempt to modify routine or difficulties in the functioning of existing 
routines - just as conscious awareness of detail and attempts of articulation are symptomatic 
of new learning or trouble in the case of individuals” (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 125).  
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Action, thus, is not entirely determined by external circumstances (Hodgson 1988). Actors do 
have an influence on their actions. They can be creative, and one of the major reasons for 
creativity is social links embedded in routines. In this way, routines change because they are 
also emergent accomplishments and “work in progress rather than finished products” 
(Feldman 2000, p. 613). “Routines are performed by people who think and feel and care. 
Their reactions are situated in institutional, organizational and personal contexts. Their actions 
are motivated by will and intention. They create, resist, engage in conflict, acquiesce to 
domination. All these forces influence the enactment of organizational routines and create in 
them a tremendous potential for change” (Feldman 2000, p.614). The nature of this change is 
linked to the intrinsic and personal visions of their members inside organizations and the 
instability of individual and organizational goals enacting a process of transformation which 
has to be negotiated at individual and collective levels. New employees may introduce some 
change in the way of doing things as Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 116) remind us. This is due 
to the explicit or implicit willingness to perfectionise routines in operation, which is 
introducing some variation. This error-prone process, not always conscious, is due to a 
learning process which is based on experience that in a world of bounded rationality is neither 
perfect nor without ambiguity (Levinthal and March 1993)6. This implies that even if 
individuals inside organizations are engaged in a process of replication of existing routines, 
nothing proves that they will succeed in copying the routine precisely. 
 
(1.3) Implication for  the replication debate 
 
All the characteristics of routines described above lead to two types of considerations for 
observing the replication of routines. First, if routines are “non-finished products and work in 
progress”, this clearly means that replication in the sense of ‘making a perfect copy’ are 
difficult and incomplete, and that the codification of some parts of knowledge is subject to 
diverse sources of imperfections due to the difficulty of extracting and capturing tacit 
knowledge. As Foray and Steinmueller recognize, “[i]f routines and the jobs performing were 
stable, the underlying sources of difficulty in making knowledge sufficiently explicit to 
improve the technologies of inscription would only be a matter of scholastic debate” (Foray 
and Steinmueller 2001, p. 16). This means that the problem of instability of routines leads to 
serious problems notably for their codification as we will explain later.  
                                                
6 Levinthal and March (1993) reported that learning processes are difficult due to factors such as bounded 
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Second, an important point in the definition of routines is that routines could be present at two 
levels. The first one is the concrete level: the routines in operation. In this case, the replication 
of routines can be conceived as a web of coordinating relationships connecting specific 
resources. This means that without these interlinked resources (material and immaterial) 
routines in operation could be difficult to replicate (Winter 1995, Winter and Szulanski, 
2001). Routines could also be present at a more abstract level, involving more difficulty in the 
replication process because the same routine may be in operation at different locations, with  a  
diverse state of resources surrounding it in each location (Winter and Szulanski, 2001).  
 
 
(2) The replication of routines 
 
We will define the notion of replication by joining diverse pieces of the literature coming 
from philosophical and biological debates. After having defined replication in the social 
sciences, we will see why the content and the levels of replication may differ.   
 
(2.1) Conceptualizing replication 
 
What happens when a routine is replicated? A fine-grained framework of replication will be 
helpful for understanding the effect that different knowledge-related characteristics have on 
the success of routines replication (for instance, how precise the copy will be, or whether the 
new routine will work as smoothly as the original one).  
 
A fine-grained framework of replication can be borrowed from the philosophy of science. It is 
known as the 'replicator-interactor model' (Hull 1980; 1981; Dawkins 1982a; 1982b; Knudsen 
2001; Knudsen 2002b; Hodgson & Knudsen 2003). This framework distinguishes two 
elements of the replication process, 'replicators' and 'interactors'. A replicator is an 'entity 
which passes its structure directly in replication' (Hull 1981, 41). Its characteristics are 
longevity (potential immortality through copies even if the individual copy has a short life), 
fecundity (a high number of copies), and fidelity (accurate production of copies). An 
interactor is an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way 
that this interaction causes replication to be differential. Two different entities are thus 
                                                                                                                                                     
rationality, simplification /specialization of experiences, temporal, spatial and failure myopia.   
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involved in the replication process, and they play different roles. The relationship between 
interactors and replicators is that replicators are carried by those interactors that were selected. 
In other words, interactors are constituted by replicators. The replicator-interactor model 
enables us to trace the steps of evolution closely and with a minimum of unexplained 
exogenous interference (Knudsen 2002b). The first step involves a (direct) replication of 
structure, and the second the (direct) interaction of the entity of interest with the environment 
in a way that results in differential replication (Knudsen 2002b). These two different steps are 
distinct, and involve different entities, replicators and interactors.  
 
In his work, Aunger has added a set of criteria that specify the replication process more 
precisely (Aunger 2002; see also Hodgson 2003): 
 
Causation: the original replicator should be causally involved in the production of the copy 
excluding by this fact unintended copies depicted by Winter (1995). 
Similarity: the copy should be similar to its source.  
Information transfer: the process of copies involves a process of producing and transferring 
information from the source. 
Duplication: the process of replication creates one or several new entities.  
 
The conditions of replication described in Aunger (2002) yield a very precise definition of 
replication. Of course, it has to be adapted to the realm of the economy. One particularity of 
replication in the economy is that perfect replication (a close copy) is up against some limits 
arising from knowledge-related aspects (for instance, replication of knowledge is more 
complicated than replication of  information). Also, there are problems due to intentionality as 
we could also envisage some unintended process of replication.  
 
(2.2) Conceptualizing replication in the economy  
 
So far, we have very briefly introduced a rather abstract conceptual framework of the 
replication process. How does it map onto the field of the economy? Concretely speaking, 
what are the replicators, and what are the interactors? 
 
Different entities have been proposed as replicators in economic evolution: while routines 
have been the most influential candidates (Nelson and Winter 1982), they are not the only 
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candidates. Other proposals have been the set of routines and practices, formal and informal, 
codified and tacit, which defines the operation of the business unit (Metcalfe 1998), or tacit 
and relatively durable knowledge components (Knudsen 2002a). Various entities have also 
been proposed as interactors. For Nelson and Winter (1982), firms are the interactors. For 
Metcalfe (1998), the interactor is the business unit associated with the particular activity. 
Knudsen  (2002b) suggests that the interactors are social identities, i.e., a conception of self 
that enable social action.  
 
Consensus on what are to be considered the equivalents to replicators and interactors in the 
realm of the economy has been emerging only recently, after debates and shifting positions 
(mainly due, it appears, to the fact that articles that deal with the issue are mostly pioneering 
efforts that touch upon a whole bundle of complex questions at the same time)7.  
 
Supported amongst others by new research into the nature of economic selection, Hodgson 
and Knudsen (2003) have forcefully argued that to identify routines as replicators and firms as 
interactors is consistent both with the requirements of models of evolution, and with the 
subject matter (economic life as we know it).  
 
(2.3) Sources of differential replication 
 
In this article, our interest lies in understanding the influence of knowledge in the replication 
of routines. On the basis of the concept of replication described above, we can thus frame the 
question in a more specific way: How does differential replication in the replication process 
come about? An answer to this question will identify the ways in which knowledge can have 
an impact on the replication outcome. This will aid our task of identifying which 
characteristics of knowledge have an impact on the outcome of the replication process. 
 
From a conceptual point of view, there are two types of sources of variation in a population of 
routines over time. First, there can be sources of variation impacting on the replication 
process, leading to variation arising in the replication process (and thus a copy that is not 
‘close’ to the original). Second, variation in the population can arise because some of the 
interactors that hold the replicators are selected out, and thus the replicators they carried also 
disappear. In our case, firms, which can be interpreted as bundles of organizational routines, 
                                                
7 Cf. Alchian (1950), Winter (1971), Winter (1975), Nelson & Winter (1982), Winter (1995).  
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are selected out by competition on markets (see Hodgson & Knudsen, 2003, for a detailed 
account; see also Knudsen 2003). 
 
As regards differential replication, we can distinguish two types of variation: recombination 
or mutation. In recombination, the elements of the replicators themselves remain unchanged, 
but are arranged in new ways. Mutation, on the other hand, involves a change in the 
components of the replicator themselves. Do these abstract notions also make sense in the 
realm of the economy? Indeed they do. Schumpeter's definition of innovation as 'introduction 
of new combinations' (Schumpeter 1934) fits the abstract concept of recombination. Clearly 
the introduction of new combinations is common in the economy. Further corroboration is to 
be found in the literature on new product development. In a seminal article, Henderson and 
Clark (1990) introduce a distinction of architectural and component knowledge, pointing out 
that technological change can have an impact either on the components themselves 
('mutation'), or on the way in which they are arranged ('recombination'). From empirical 
research on routines, we further know that another important distinction pertaining to the 
replication of routines is between replication by the firm itself and by outsiders. The 
difference is that in the first case, the imitator has access to the template, in this way 
generating an intended process of replication, while in the second it does not.  
 
In the process of the interaction of interactors with the environment, variation (for instance 
different ways of forming a piece of steel into a screw) is being limited by ejection8 of 
interactors (and thereby the replicators carried by these interactors). Such ejection takes place 
through selection mechanisms. Different selection mechanisms can be at work. In the case of 
the economy, there are market selection (competition), and managerial selection (internal to 
firms) (Knudsen, 2002b). For instance, the technique by which steel is formed into screws can 
be selected through a tender offer, i.e. by abiding to administrative rules, through allocating 
the decision rights to an experienced engineer (with his knowledge of steel), or through a 
manager who holds the decision rights, but follows some criterion that is connected neither to 
steel nor to screws.   
 
The replicator-interactor model thus allows us to distinguish two occasions in which variation 
in a population can be influenced: the (i) replication process (the ‘copying’, or transmission) 
of the replicators, i.e. routines and (ii) the interaction of the interactors with the environment, 
                                                
8 We take the notion of selection as 'ejection' from Thorbjørn Knudsen (2002b). 
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i.e. of firms on markets. Note that because it is firms that are the ‘carriers’ of routines 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2003), the second process has an effect on variation of a particular 
routine in the population, due to the fact that some firms (and with them their organizational 
routines) are selected out of the population, while others enter the population. For tracking the 
variation-reducing mechanism, it is therefore important to apply a population-perspective 
(regarding populations of routines), and to analyze the selection of firms, which are 
considered as bundles of routines, and which are eliminated from markets by competition, 
their routines thus disappearing with them9.  
 
 
(3) The role of codification in the replication process 
 
We will now focus our attention on the role of knowledge in productive activity for seeing 
why replication goes beyond the aggregation of commodity. Once this statement clear 
enough, we will define replication and codification as two complementary parts necessary for 
duplicating routines. Some problems are enlightened the  ‘causal ambiguity’ and the modes of 
conversion of knowledge during codification process.  
  
(3.1)  The knowledge dimension of productivity activity and its consequences for routines 
replication  
 
One could have the impression that in the entrepreneurial drive to diffuse good practices and 
to copy well-working “industry recipes” (Spender, 1989), routines could be replicated easily. 
However, this is not the case even where the entrepreneur tries to codify the recipes in order 
to achieve that goal. The problem of the “non additivity principle” matters, because the inputs 
cannot be reproduced in a perfect manner. Winter (1982) shows that one problem with the 
neoclassical framework resided in the fact that neoclassical authors could define ex ante 
inputs in very general and abstract ways but define the nature of the outputs very precisely. 
The question, of course, is how diverse inputs are used in a different way, for example in 
another spatial or temporal dimension. What is very important in this context is that the result 
could be very different. For Winter, the problem resides not in the perfect additivity of input 
(and the creation of new quantitative inputs as the neoclassical framework tries to introduce 
                                                
9 On the competitive process from a Nelson and Winter perspective see Metcalfe and Gibbons (1986). These 
authors combine the Schumpeterian debate and Austrian insights in a model of technological variety’s selection. 
For diverse models focused on Fisher’s replicator, see also Metcalfe (1993). For a more general issue about 
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by putting for example the social capital or the ‘elementary regions’ in order to take into 
account the spatial dimension or the human dimension), but in the conceptual definition of 
production. According to Winter, production should not be envisaged as a potential additivity 
and proportionality of inputs but a qualitative process building productive capability, 
something difficult to produce and difficult to replicate10.  
 
This principle is due to the fact that knowledge is not information and requires specific 
attention for its replication. This means that while information can be transferred easily 
without damaging its content, knowledge is dependent on its carriers (notably, human 
carriers). This implies that routines exist with two constituents: an inert form (some 
procedures which have been codified or partly articulated) and, on the other hand, an ‘alive’ 
or activated  form of knowledge for making sense of the codified one. As the two parts are 
mutually inter-dependent, this means that the degree of stability and persistence could be 
partly correlated to the degree of codification embedded in knowledge even if there is a 
permanent co-evolution of tacit and articulated knowledge.  
 
Tacit elements may be difficult or even impossible to articulate (Winter 1987). Cognitive and 
economic arguments are present as articulation and codification are very costly and may be 
some time confronted to a risk of loosing sense introduced by problems of transmissions  and 
more specifically differences of languages (as each language has its own way to represent 
knowledge - oral vs. articulated). This may involve some technical difficulties in capturing 
and transferring knowledge with a risk of loosing some crucial tacit elements that are needed 
to make sense of the codified knowledge (Lazaric, Mangolte and Massue 2003; Zollo and 
Winter 2002). Because articulation is one way to communicate a template (e.g., having a 
description of an activity sequence), when such a description cannot be made, replication of 
the template is more difficult. Higher variation is therefore likely, as the person involved in 
the replication act has to infer what is unarticulable. In doing so, errors or misunderstanding 
                                                                                                                                                     
competitive market, see Metcalfe (1998).  
10 For Winter, the neoclassical vision of productive introduced by Wicksteed has some limits. He shares 
consequently Hahn’s statement that “the common sense proposition that duplication of a given industrial process 
(together incidentally with a duplication of entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial function) will lead to a doubling of 
the output is unassailable“ (Hahn, 1949 in Winter 1982). Winter is also quite sceptical about the standard vision 
of defining commodity a “good or service completely specified physically, temporally and spatially” (Debreu p. 
32.) and to introduce by this way time divided in ‘elementary  intervals’ and space into ‘ elementary regions’ that 
are “chosen small enough for all the points of one of them to be indistinguishable from the point of view of the 
analysis” (Debreu p.24). This device allows some abstraction and generality for treating space and time on the 
same footing as all other commodities. Nevertheless in the spirit of the productive knowledge, the physical 
characteristics of commodities, and their conditions of production are not the same as well as the distinction of 
time and space.   
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can happen.  
 
(3.2)  Replication and codification: two constituent parts?  
  
At this stage we could ask ourselves what are the differences between codification and 
replication. Indeed it seems that some similarities are present between Aunger’s proposal  
which focuses on the replication of information, and the process of codification depicted 
notably  by Cowan and Foray (1997). In fact, the codification process is certainly more 
complex than it first looks. There are three reasons for this:  
 
Cowan and Foray (1997) see the process of codification as including three aspects: model 
building, language creation and writing the message. They are of the opinion that 
technological change can create some dynamic in the process of codification by decreasing 
the costs of this process. Nevertheless, for them and some others (Cowan, Foray and David, 
2000), the problem of codification resides in the model creation and notably the capacity to 
articulate knowledge in order to codify it, as well as the development of language for  
building a shared and generic language to go beyond local jargons. Needless to say, 
investments in this process are very high because the diffusion of codified language depends 
on the capacity of implementing investments for building a community able to read the codes 
(Arrow, 1974). 
 
This process is distinct from the process described by Aunger’s criteria because it does not 
relyon a copy of information but more extensively on the development of models and 
languages. By this way, we could consider that codification is part of the replication process 
because it participates in the process of the articulation of knowledge and its articulation 
through the investment in shared language. Perhaps a small but important difference resides in 
the way of conceiving this process. For David, Cowan and Foray (2000) the problem is 
related to a problem of incentives and costs. These authors are also quite sceptical about that 
interest of tacit knowledge, seeing it as a brake for this process. On the contrary, for Winter 
(1987) and others authors (Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall, 2002), tacit knowledge and 
codified knowledge are not opposite but complementary because these two kinds of 
knowledge are the intrinsic parts of the codification process. Codified knowledge has little 
added value without human intelligence and human judgment for making sense of codes and 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 15
for activate them in an innovative way. This problem has been examined in many case studies 
of the introduction of expert systems. In this case, tacit knowledge still remains and is still 
important for maintaining and for updating diverse forms of knowledge, notably codified ones 
(Lazaric, Mangolte and Massue, 2003).  
 
The concrete implication for our argument here is that codification and replication are 
interlinked and are two constituents of the same process even if the different authors do not 
see it in the same way. For some authors, tacit knowledge is an obstacle to  replication and 
tacit knowledge has to be domesticated (Foray and Steinmuller, 2001), whereas for us and  
other authors, tacit knowledge is not seen in a pejorative way and is considered as two 
complementary forms of knowledge expressed in different ways. According to us, codes are 
typically incomplete and the codification in itself does not guarantee the replication because 
this relies on the relation between the recipient and the receptor. This leads to a  difficult 
process of knowledge extraction from individuals and from groups during the explicitation of 
tacit knowledge ( Nonaka 1995) and some difficulty in the codification due to diverse modes 
of knowledge conversion with some potential mismatch between the emitter and the receptor ( 
Ancori et al 2000).  
 
This means that replication is based on investment in building codes, and at the same time on 
the absorption of knowledge in order to make sense of and to adapt the codes to another 
context. Winter and Szulanski summarize this point: 
 
“[l]leveraging knowledge by replication of routines necessarily involves an investment in 
communication infrastructure, at least in the form of training in the organization’s specialized 
language. Adequate command of the language requires, however substantial knowledge of 
organizational context: the link of information to action typically depends on the knowledge 
based interpretative powers of human beings. Hence the organizational use of symbolic 
information depends on the stocks of knowledge held by participants; much of this is tacit 
and/or context dependent and it reflects the accumulation of local experiences. Under these 
circumstances, the creation of requisite knowledge stocks a new outlet can be accomplished 
only trough a variety of costly processes that are substantially less straightforward that a 
standard notion of transmission of information would suggest. It often includes processes that 
both require support from a template site and involve a significant component of new 
organizational learning at the new outlet” (Winter and Szulanski, 2001, p. 24).   
 
For these authors, the problem is not to deny the impact of codification which is as important 
as the encoding/decoding processes for providing suitable information. Nevertheless, if 
replication could produce some valuable template and an abstract quasi-informational source 
 16
of economic merit, called the “Arrow core“, this does not deny the strategic role of knowledge 
and causal ambiguity in learning and knowledge transfer.  
 
 
(3.3) Causal ambiguity 
 
In the information paradigm, the main idea is to show that information is cheap to reproduce. 
This belief is based on three points:  1) The “non rivalrous” character of information , i.e. the 
fact that reproduction does not decrease the information content of the source, 2) the absence 
of ambiguity about information content of the original which is reproduced, and 3) the 
relatively low cost of the reproduction process.  
 
The examples of replicating routines show precisely which problems are involved in the 
process when there is ‘causal ambiguity’. This condition arises because of knowledge 
tacitness but also because of difficulties in replicating important technological systems where 
systemic relations between elements are important: “in complex highly interdependent human 
and technological systems, the causes of success and failure are difficult to assign …and the 
establishment of cause effect relationships can be very difficult and the concomitant 
assessment of performance may be highly ambiguous. In short, causal ambiguity ensues from 
complexity and potential imitation by rivals through observation is limited“ (Reed and 
Defillippi, 1990, p. 92).  
 
Causal ambiguity (which can be connected to uncertainty or complexity) makes it difficult to 
attribute properties to (elements of) templates. Deliberate replication attempts might therefore 
be frustrated, as it is not clear what precisely has to be copied, or what about a template is the 
crucial part that has to be copied exactly (Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Reed and Defillippi 
1990). This shows that others elements (technological complexity or relational assets like 
notably the relations between firm and customers) than just knowledge tacitness present 
difficulties in the replication of routines.  
 
(3.4)  Knowledge absorption and knowledge receptivity  
 
Knowledge replication also relies on the receptor’s ability to absorb and to integrate new 
knowledge. This is because knowledge has different properties from information. Some prior 
knowledge and some absorptive capacity has to be developed for assuring knowledge 
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receptivity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Knowledge is not absorbed by individuals, but 
structured by them because each piece of knowledge should be integrated in individual 
cognitive frameworks. This leads to some structuration of knowledge and some coherence and 
inertia inside memory, notably when some cognitive automatisms are implemented and used 
(Loasby 1999).  
 
This problem has also to do with the structure of memory at the individual and organization 
level (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994). It has been argued that before knowledge can be 
transformed in a procedure and in automatisms, it has to be exercised. This explains the 
reasons why when automatisms have been engaged, some levels of organizational inertia may 
prevail as members of the organization prefer not to learn new automatisms and not to unlearn 
old ones in order to change existing routines. Furthermore, as Gersick and Hackman (1990) 
have reminded us, sometimes cognitive automatisms are so deeply embedded in 
organizational members that they are difficult to forget even if environmental conditions 
require some change. For example, the Air Florida Accident in 1982 was mainly due to the 
basic application of habitual routine in the cockpit despite a drastic environmental change 
introduced by snowfall. The crew was unable to modify the habitual task in order to adapt it 
to a new situation. This inertia was partly due to the lack of activation of the anti-ice 
procedure in order to deal with snowfall. This tends to show that sometimes, habitual routines 
activated in a certain way are difficult to de-activate because they are crystallized in 
procedural memory which by repetition gives some feeling of security and stability, thus 
impeding transformation required by the environment. In this way, empirical studies show the 
difficulty of maintaining constituent elements in the same way and inertia coming from prior 
knowledge.  
 
4. Forms and dimension of replication  
 
The complexity and difficulty in routines replication depend also on the nature of the 
replication, its scope, its superficial or profound nature as well as its spatial or temporal 
dimensions.  
 
(4.1) Replication of mental instead of physical structure 
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One reason for the lack of clarity in our understanding of replication might be that different 
levels are being confounded. For example, we could investigate the activation of routines and 
their concrete form which would lead to an investigation of behaviour, namely recurrent 
interaction patterns persistent in organizations. We could also investigate routines in an 
abstract form (rules of behaviour). Clearly, these two levels of analysis need to be 
distinguished, also because the level of analysis leads to the choice of empirical method. This 
could be the formal rules behind routines or interactions around routines, a point that is 
directly correlated to the philosophical perspective on knowledge and the reality we want to 
observe, notably the way we define cognition (see Lazaric 2000, Lorenz 2002).  
 
A long-standing argument in the literature on routines has been whether routines are 
representations (for instance, rules, procedures, heuristics), or behaviours that express such 
mental or articulated representations. As Knudsen has argued (Knudsen 2002b), if routines 
are to be replicators, they have to be representations. They have to be some kind of 
information-set. So much we know from the abstract framework. In the case of routines, 
where is the information-set represented? 
 
There are two possible levels of representation: external and internal (mental) representation. 
Only on the level of external representation, are replicators bound in physical structures – on 
the mental levels the memorised 'contents' obviously are not represented by the physical 
structure of the brain in the same way that DNA is. In this sense, the level of internal (mental) 
representation is very much unlike the biological realm. In the case of internally represented 
rules, the template is a mental instead of a physical structure. The articulation of mental 
structures, however, is subject to limits to articulation (or rather, the precision of such an 
articulation is subject to limits). This is due to the fact that knowledge has to be 
communicated to others to be articulated, and that human beings may lack the willingness to 
do so (in order to protect the template), or may do it quite imperfectly because the articulation 
is subject to personal re-interpretation. If there are no correction mechanisms, error might be 
incorporated in what is passed on. The notion of replication as in the philosophy of science 
appears to apply to the level of external representation (a physical replication of physical 
structure is possible for example by way of photocopying). Rules that are represented 
internally (mentally), however, are substantially different in that they do not have a physical 
structure that could be replicated. Different replication mechanisms are therefore required. 
Replication in the realm of the economy has to also refer to some kind of replication of 
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mental, rather than physical structure. At least for (exclusively) mentally represented rules 
(i.e., necessarily tacit, unarticulable ones), the 'philosophy-of-science-inspired' replication 
concept seems inadequate in the realm of the economy. Note also another implication of 
mental structures as replication units: being cognitive, they depend on perception. Perception, 
however, is bound to change when social circumstances change, but also when cognitive 
biases and other mechanisms make themselves felt (Schechner 1985).11  
 
(4.2)  Spatial dimensions of replication   
 
According to Nelson and Winter (1982), problems with conceptualizing replication stem from 
the definition of routines as both the genes and the organizational memory of firms. In fact, by 
defining routines as organizational memory, Nelson and Winter have attempted to introduce 
the knowledge problem – an explicit critique of neoclassical production and the “non-
additivity principle” (Winter, 1982). Clearly, it has been shown that the problem was not to 
deal with a perfectly defined input that could be transferred in another production set - such as 
information - but rather a qualitative transformation of these inputs along space and time. One 
of the main problems is to deal with knowledge in diverse forms (codified or tacit) and to see 
why the same inputs, after transformation, could generate important mutation. A major cause 
is different organization structures, formal and informal, and the knowledge embedded within 
firms, which makes production quite distinct from one firm to another one (Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Dosi, Nelson and Winter 2001). For example, when attempting replication of 
routines, “replicability” will be imperfect mainly due to: local specificities (each site has some 
peculiarities), obstacles to perfect replication due to cognitive and motivational aspect of the 
routine, and  interactions of the routines with the site involved (some sub-constituents may be 
difficult to reproduce, notably “particular raw material sources, environmental contaminants, 
labour pool or customer population”, Winter 1995, p. 162).  
 
As Winter (1995) has reminded us, a change of micro components may alter the nature of 
replication. In a case study conducted by one of the authors (Lorenz and Lazaric, 2000), we 
observed this process with the creation of Japanese transplants trying to replicate their 
                                                
11 In the same vein, Goody introduces some fundamental distinction between a “first degree of codification”  
involving the facsimile reproduction of oral and visual images requiring not a  real complex representation of 
knowledge and a “second degree of codification” requiring a model to express this knowledge (Goody in Foray 
and Steinmueller 2001). In the second degree of codification the replication is also internal and this implies the 
creation of cognitive structures of generating and absorbing this new form of codification going beyond physical 
replication.  
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organizational practice in Europe (UK and France). The major problem of this replication was 
not the content of the organizational practice which could be reproduced more or less conform 
to the template (with a high degree of socialization in Japan to give some sense and value to 
organizational practices oriented to quality change), but rather the labour force which differ 
radically regarding their institutions. For example, implicit contract incentives systems were 
totally different and so was the motivation of the individuals to activate the organizational 
practice in question (Fabry and Lazaric, 2000). Notably, the long-term term engagement of 
Japanese employees is perceived quite differently in French and British contexts because 
industrial relations are different and because implicit contracts concerning hiring and 
promotion are institutionalised in a different manner giving a different meaning of personal 
engagement, individual performance, and organizational efficiency. This means that the 
expression of routines is very different from the original because human creativity has 
different ways of integrating some organizational routines and these are always embedded in 
social contexts and institutions giving opportunities for change when they are transferred out 
of their original context. As a matter of fact, the replication of organizational practices was 
recombined according to the nature of the labour force, but also according to the 
characteristics of the size of the local firm (which in France or in UK was smaller than in the 
case of the template). All these small mutations introduced some new learning paths and new 
routines were activated, with important differences in terms of efficiency and practices.  
 
As the main carriers of knowledge are human, there is always a personal interpretation when 
knowledge is transferred (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). This provides some alteration of the 
old routines and some mutation of its constituents. Even if the efforts dedicated to codification 
are high in order to achieve great replication potentiality, the transfer of routines always has to 
deal with some element of personal appropriation and collective acceptance which shows the 
limits of the transfer from an initial routine (Lorenz and Lazaric, 2001). As Winter has 
pointed out, due to the political aspects of routines “such a replication effort involves not 
merely the establishment of the appropriate physical setting, but also the replication of a 
hierarchical structure of organizational routines” (Winter, 1995, p. 157).  
 
Interpretation may also arise from a lack of understanding. This is notably due to newcomers 
that try to espouse routines activated with a more or less planned outcome: 
 
 “Mutations are not always deleterious. To put it another way, maintenance of prevailing 
routine is often an operational target but it is not an ultimate objective. Modifications of 
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routine that involve improvements in role performance are presumably welcome. However in 
functioning complex systems with many highly differentiated and tightly interdependent 
parts, it is highly unlikely that undirected change is a single part will have beneficial aspects 
of the systems; this, of course, is the basis for the biological proposition that mutation tend to 
be deleterious on the average. An organizational member trying to do a better job can 
presumably accomplish something more than “undirected change”, but changes that seems 
like obvious viewed from a particular role can easily have adverse effects elsewhere in the 
system. With the aid of comprehensive understanding of the system as a whole, beneficial 
directed change in a part might reliably accomplished. But since nobody in a complex system 
organization actually has that sort of comprehensive understanding, it is clear a fortiori that 
new employees does not have it” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 116).  
 
 
(4.3)  Involvement in the replication process and compatibility with diverse habits and 
values 
 
Behind the notion of replication in its spatial dimension and the problem of adaptation to local 
is also a problem of the nature of the replication. In the definition of routine, we insisted on 
the fact that routines are non-finished products that are still in progress, and that people are 
individuals who feel and care. This point is important in the replication process, in order to 
accept and integrate new organizational practices. In fact, certain practices coming from 
outside conflict with local habits and practices, and the social process of routines replication is 
going to be disturbed. Nevertheless, if the value proposed by the routines that are to be copied 
does not enter in conflicts with pre-existing one, the process could be successful. This aspect 
has been very well summarized by Kilduff (1992), who points out that the replication of 
American routines in Japan was a real success in some cases, whereas in other case this was a 
failure.  
 
“The opening of the Tokyo Disneyland was a surprise to many observers because compared 
to the Los Angeles original, the Japanese copy was in many respects more faithful to Disney’s 
philosophy. In Tokyo, the grounds were more spotless, the crowds more neatly dressed and 
better behaved and the whole park more efficient. The differences from the original tended to 
consist of deliberate concessions to Japanese preferences (such as subtitles in Japanese 
beneath certain signs) rather than unexpected deteriorations in performances (...) What makes 
the Disney story of the more than perfect duplication even more fascinating is the fact that the 
Tokyo Disneyland was an autonomous local unit, owned by investors who simply paid 
Disney royalties from receipts? It was the Japanese investors and executives who insisted 
upon a facsimile, not Disney headquarters. The lesson seems to be that a complete set of 
organizational practices can be successfully transplanted if the guiding philosophy governing 
these routines is fully compatible with the habits of those responsible for day to day 
implementation. The Disney philosophy of cleanliness, orderliness efficiency, and 
cooperative behaviour was fully acceptable to the Japanese (Kilduff, 1992, p. 137).  
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(4.4) Broad or narrow scope of replication  
 
The extent of replication matters. In fact, the transfer of large routines may create some 
important change redefining the organizational context of the firm, whereas if replication is 
reduced to narrow scope – such as for instance only one organizational practice and not the 
routine in its abstract form – the organizational context where the routine is replicated could 
remain relatively stable. The transfer of a large routine will greatly modify the organizational 
context redefining its identity and social links surrounding routines. This could reactivate 
latent conflicts and disrupt some routines in operation.  In contrast, a transfer of a small 
routine could be considered of narrow scope because the organizational context of target 
organization will remain stable (Winter and Szulanski 2001). In a transfer of narrow scope, 
the locus of adaptation will be limited as well the relation with inner and outer organizational 
environments. Indeed, in a narrow scope replication this involves sets of practices of key 
systems rather than an entire business model. In some cases, dysfunctions can be observed 
between the new ways of doing things and the old ones, and sometimes some  
accommodation could be found. Sometimes organizational changes can be easily absorbed, 
sometimes they are not leading to difficult conflicts impeding the firm to find some good 
compromise. When a new establishment is created, in the case of broad replication the legacy 
of the past has a low weight. The broad scope of replication could be more difficult to achieve 
where there are conflicts between old values and new ways of doing things. This could be one 
argument for creating Greenfield activities that avoid the problem of two conflicting systems 
of industrial relations.  
 
(4.5) Access to the template   
 
The replication of routines has recently been investigated by Winter and Szulanski (e.g., 
Szulanski and Winter 2002). One of the major findings of their empirical studies is that access 
to the template matters for how much variation is induced in the replication process. The role 
of the template is to guide replication. The better access to the template (and thus the 
possibility to study it), the better the chance to receive a precise copy. Without access to the 
template, one has to infer elements of the template that one cannot access, thereby giving rise 
to additional variation. Another function of access to the template is the possibility of 
checking if problems in the replication process arise, allowing the correction of copying 
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errors. Rivkin (2001) has added the insight of the role of complexity, pointing out that 
moderate complexity can achieve a similar effect to access to the template, namely, to enable 
replication of the routine within the firm but restrict imitation by outsiders. 
 
 
 ( 5)  Discussion 
 
The paper has tackled the question of the influence of knowledge in the replication of 
routines, according to the arguments of the resource-based view a question of high strategic 
importance for firms. We have attempted to contribute to the question by scrutinizing one 
aspect of the replication of routines, namely the influence of knowledge and knowledge-
related aspects in the replication of routines. In order to do so, we have first built up a 
framework that adds clarity to our endeavour and sharpens our analytical perspective by 
highlighting  the cognitive and social dimensions of routines.  
 
The clarity added by the interactor-replicator framework is that if we are interested in 
explaining variation in a population of routines (e.g. of manufacturing practices in a particular 
industry), replication is only one part of the explanation. The other part of the explanation is 
selection, which takes place in the interaction process. In this process, interactors (which 
contain the replicators) interact with the environment and in doing so, some are ejected from 
the population, they are selected out. As Hodgson and Knudsen (2003) have argued, in the 
economy, routines are the replicators and firms are the interactors. As firms are selected out 
by competitive pressure, so are the particular routines that these firms had formed (for 
instance Toyota’s quality management routines).  
 
If we are interested in understanding the replication process itself, the replicator-interactor 
distinction makes clear that we should not confound replication (in which variation is 
introduced) with selection (in which population-level variation is reduced) – simply because 
what is being replicated is not what is subjected to selection. While routines are replicated, it 
is firms that interact on markets, not routines. The importance of that argument is that it 
disentangles the problem and enables us to focus on a particular aspect: the replication 
process of routines for explaining how variation arises in the replication process (with some 
degree of crudeness, we could say, on a micro level), and the interaction (selection) process of 
firms for explaining the variation of routines in the population of, say, firms in an industry. 
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The second body of literature the paper has drawn on then be connected to some insights on 
the role of knowledge in the replication process that were gained in empirical research. One 
insight that the material assembled in this paper has yielded is that knowledge-related aspects 
have an impact on many different levels: (i) the institutional framework (of the organization as 
well as the wider institutions it is embedded in), (ii) the individual actor involved in the 
execution and replication of the routine, and (iii) knowledge-characteristics of the routine 
itself. This is perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive, as the most obvious way in which 
knowledge has an influence in the replication process seems to be the characteristics of the 
template routine (notably, the degree to which it is tacit). 
 
On the level of (i) the institutional framework, the empirical studies provide a strong 
argument for taking the institutional context into account, and for taking it seriously, in order 
to attain an understanding of the replication of routines. A number of ways have been 
identified in the paper in which the institutional context has an influence on the outcome of 
the replication process. The activation of routines (the execution of rules and standard 
operating procedures, for instance) relies on the institutional framework within which this 
activation takes place. Different industrial relations and different ideas of work ethic are 
examples of how the institutional level influences the activation of routines. Note that what 
would be required in order to produce a ‘perfect’ copy of the original template would be 
detailed knowledge about these institutions. Empirical studies indicate that to the extent that 
the background knowledge that actors draw on in activating the routine is not the same, the 
replication outcome will not be a close one. A second knowledge-related influence that the 
institutional framework has on the replication process is by way of compatibility of the 
knowledge contained in the routine with the higher-order knowledge of the organization 
(embedded for instance in assumptions, values and beliefs common to all organization 
members). The broader the scope of the routine to be replicated, the more likely the 
organization will react to incompatibilities. The higher-order knowledge of the organization, 
shared by the organization members, also represents a mental framework that is locally 
specific. All these points support an institutional perspective on the replication of routines.  
 
This point becomes important for the second level, (ii) the human actor. As soon as human 
actors are involved in the replication of routines, the individual characteristics of the actors 
involved in the routine and its replication have an influence on the replication outcome. (This 
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is why the question of whether a mental or a physical template is involved is important) . As 
soon as human actors are involved, perception and interpretation are always involved, and 
because they can be individually different, variation is introduced in the replication process. 
Other ways in which actors have an influence on the replication of routines is by their 
willingness and capacity to absorb. 
 
The perhaps most obvious (iii) characteristic of the template routine that impinges on the 
replication process is its tacitness. This point has been developed most in the extant literature. 
To the extent that the knowledge contained in the routine is characterized by causal ambiguity 
and complexity, higher variation in the replication outcome can in principle be expected. The 
access to the template routine also matters because it determines the possibility to fill in 
missing knowledge in case the replica does not come out close to the template. A final 
characteristic of the template that matters is whether it is a mental or physical template. The 
difference matters because in order to imagine a replication without the influence of human 
actors and the (substantial) possibility of variation introduced by way of error, interpretation 
etc., one would need to argue for a purely physical replication process of a purely physical 
template. Provocatively, one could ask the question whether it would not be more appropriate 
to speak of ‘recreation’ of a template routine rather than its replication where human actors 
are involved (Becker 2001), as descriptions of human learning often point out that the 
successful acquisition of knowledge involves some degree of reconstructing an argument 
rather than its mere ‘repetition’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of the paper was to scrutinize the influence of knowledge in the replication of 
routines. Maybe the most fundamental conclusion to be emphasized here is that a multi-level 
perspective on the replication of routines is required in order to capture the influences of 
knowledge in the replication of routines. Namely, the levels of the institutional environment, 
the individual human actor, and the characteristics of the template routines. The first task is to 
identify what knowledge-related aspects there are on each of these levels. The subsequent 
challenge is to identify the mechanisms by which these have an influence on the replication of 
routines. The list of knowledge-related aspects drawn up in this paper is indicative and, we 
strongly suspect, not comprehensive. Our investigation of the mechanisms by which they 
influence the replication of routines is still more preliminary. Our intention was to provide a 
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framework for tackling the issue and do the first step in filling and illustrating this framework. 
Many interesting research opportunities, both conceptual and empirical, remain in filling in 
the framework and gaps in our understanding.  
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